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11. INTRODUCTION
Innovation is increasingly recognized as a key variable in explaining local
industrial growth. On the one hand, innovation has become a critical element in
maintaining competitiveness. On the other hand, the capacity of firms to innovate
depends not only on firm level characteristics but also on ‘structure’ and ‘local
conditions’.
Michael Best has given a powerful interpretation of the changing nature of
competition, with his theory of ‘new competition’ (Best, 1990). New competition
distinguishes itself from ‘old’ competition in four dimensions. Firstly, and at the centre
of his theory is the entrepreneurial firm, which is “an enterprise that is organised, from
top to bottom to pursue continuous improvement in methods, products and processes”
(ibid:2). The latter constitutes the basis of strategic advantage, rather than lower
production costs per se. Best rejects the notion of the product cycle, according to which
technological innovation passes through a sequential process, ultimately leading to a
low cost mass production technology. In stead, a firm would have to pursue continuous
improvements, something that has organisational requirements and demands attention
to detail. The second dimension is the importance of the production or commodity
chain. Competitiveness depends as much on the firm itself as on that of its suppliers.
Suppliers are an important source of innovation and improvement. Under new
competition conditions supplier and buyer invest in long term relationships, consult and
jointly establish quality norms and standards. The third dimension concerns the
importance of so-called ‘sector institutions’: “A sector can include a variety of inter-
firm practices and extra-firm agencies such as trade associations, apprenticeship
programmes, labour education facilities, joint marketing arrangements and regulatory
commissions, each of which facilitates inter-firm co-operation” (ibid:17). In other
words, “firms not only compete, but they can also co-operate to provide common
services, to shape ‘the rules of the game’ and to shape complementary investment
strategies” (ibid). The fourth aspect is a strategic industrial policy on the part of
government which would need to have a production rather than a distribution focus,
seeking to shape markets, stimulating and undertaking complementary investments in
support systems, and encouraging firms to develop strategic alliances.
Is the local ‘structure’ conducive to cooperation between firms? Local
‘conditions’ refer, amongst others, to basic infrastructure and to the existence of
2institutions, such as science & technology centers, intermediary support organizations
etc. Are local conditions conducive to innovation by firms? (Helmsing, 1998a). Indeed
in developed countries, technology gaps help to explain (inter-)regional growth
differentials (e.g. Landabaso, 1997). Technology gaps refer to the lack of innovation
effort by public and private sectors and the poor adaptation of R&D efforts to the
specific needs of firms in the region concerned. The EU has launched an ambitious
program for the promotion of innovation in the less favored regions of the EU (the
STRIDE program) which is seen by several commentators as an answer to the real
causes rather than only dealing with symptoms of high unemployment. Morgan (1997)
proposed the notion of learning region and emphasized that innovation is an interactive
process between a firm and its environment. In the latter, clients, other firms and S&T
and regulatory institutions play key roles. Storper (1992, 1995) argued that innovation
requires both technological and organizational learning. Industrial agglomerations
provide the basis for both. Not only in terms of localized input-output relations between
firms, but also in terms of so-called untraded interdependencies. These include labour
markets, local regional industrial practices, ‘rules of the games’, and public and
collective institutions. Maillat (1992, 1997) formulated the notion of innovative milieu
and argued that the (economic) attractiveness of a city or ‘territory’ is “no longer a
function of the locational factor it offers but of its production system’s ability to create
specific resources and to generate innovation processes” (1998:9). The innovative
milieu consists of patterns of interaction between firms and science & technology and
regulatory institutions to enhance the innovative capacity of firms. Most of this
theoretical discussion takes place on and in OECD countries. Do these propositions
apply to middle income countries that have been going through processes of structural
adjustment and liberalization? There is relatively little research on this and this paper is
only a partial contribution.
The paper is based on a research project, entitled “Urban economic restructuring
and local institutional response”, which is currently being carried out. This research
project has the following aims: i) to examine the competitive responses of
manufacturing firms in the city of Bulawayo, to liberalization and opening up of the
Zimbabwean economy; ii) to examine the use of support services, and,  iii) to examine
the role of business or producer services. Below some of the  findings are presented
and, in addition, we seek to address the following questions: a) To what extent have
3firms followed innovative responses? Are there any differences between innovative and
non-innovative firms in terms of their concrete actions, and in terms of the role played
by support services? Do innovative firms differ in terms of their demand for business or
producer services? By dealing with these issues,  we seek to answer the question: is
there a basis for creating an innovative milieu in Bulawayo?
Section 2 is devoted to a background review of recent changes in the
Zimbabwean economy and of Bulawayo, where the research has been conducted.
Section 3 introduces the research and describes threats, strategic responses and actions
of all firms and examine differences between ‘innovative’ and ‘defensive’ firms.
Section 4 examines the role of enterprise support services and institutional preferences
of firms. Section 5 looks as business or producer services. The final section makes
some concluding observations in terms of the basis for creating an innovative milieu in
Bulawayo.
2. ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY BEFORE AND SINCE STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT
2.1. Prior to ESAP
The immediate post-independence boom was cut short by a severe drought, poor
world economic performance as well as acts of South African destabilization. The
average economic growth was not more than 1.6 per cent per annum over the first five
years after 1980. The second half of the eighties gave a more favourable picture. For the
decade as a whole an average of 3.4 per cent real growth per annum was achieved.
Given the high population growth (of nearly 3%), per capita income declined in the first
half, and slightly improved during the second half of the nineteen eighties.
The 'boom-bust' performance of the economy is also reflected in the balance of
payments. Its current account deficit worsened in the early and mid eighties only to
recover and turn into a deficit at the end of the decade. It should be added though that in
comparison to the boom-bust fluctuations of other countries those in Zimbabwe are
much smaller and influenced by non-economic factors, such as recurrent droughts).
Manufacturing industry has been and remained through out the 80s a net user of foreign
exchange.
The industrial sector with all its diversity is relatively small. According to the
Census of Manufacturing, there are less that 1100 units. They produce as many as 6000
4products but markets are small, and competitors few. The domestic market had been
almost completely shielded from competing imports since the early sixties and this
generated monopolistic and heavy oligopolistic enterprises which over time diversified
into other existing or new product market areas. Many of these economic activities are
controlled by a small number of economic conglomerates such as Delta Corporation,
the TM group, etc., in which the foreign investment component was and still is very
high.
There was notably little 'structural change' in industry after Independence. The
most noteworthy is the relative decline of metal and metal products, and the relative
increase in drinks & tobacco and chemical & petroleum products subsectors. On
balance the 80s resulted in a 3.6% increase in real output per annum and a 2.1% annual
increase in employment.
Apart from the low employment growth, the most important disturbing post-
independence feature has been the lack of industrial investment. Gross domestic capital
formation (GDCF) was very low, and according to some (e.g. Green & Khadani), there
was no net increase in the capital stock in the 80s. The rate of investment (GFCF / GDP
1980) fell in real terms from 15.3% in 1980 to an estimated low of 10.7% by 1989. It
should be noted that the GDCF that did take place was too a large extent undertaken by
the public sector, in the form of infrastructural investments.
It is difficult to get a reasonably balanced picture of the major constraints on
investment. A survey in the late 80s reported the following factors influencing new
investment (in order of importance): expected return on investment; forex availability;
insufficient local demand; business confidence (Hawkins et al, 1988). Whatever the
‘success’ in Zimbabwe's industrial sector, the fact is that the investment rate
dramatically declined in the 80s. The relative stagnation and the failure to generate
employment and income generating opportunities for a fast growing labour force, is
generally seen as the principal driving force that pushed the Government to adopt a
package of economic reform measures, which became known as the Economic
Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP).
2.2.  Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
The ESAP was launched in 1991 in order to revitalize the private sector through
deregulation and reduced government intervention and by decreasing the latter’s
5absorption of resources1. The programme had a number of specific objectives of trade
and exchange rate liberalization by  creating a market based foreign exchange system
and by gradually replacing the administrative import restrictions by a (reduced) tariff
based protection.In addition, the programme aimed at a commercialization of public
enterprises so as to reduce their operational losses which were constituting a heavy
burden on the national budget. Furthermore, a civil service reform was meant to reduce
the public sector wage bill by substantial reduction in the number of public sector
employees. The last two mentioned policies would contribute to a substantial reduction
of the central government budget deficit. A liberalization of the financial sector was
announced. The program aimed at a domestic deregulation of product and labour
markets and announced measures to promote foreign investment.
The ESAP program foresaw a number of ‘supporting sectoral initiatives’ which
included amongst others, informal sector and small enterprise support. The latter
focused on matters of deregulation concerning licenses and other legal restrictions and
on access to (and cost of) finance. Promotional measures were announced to
supplement the already existing activities of the Small Enterprise Development
Corporation (SEDCO) and the small enterprise credit scheme of Zimbank. A Venture
Capital Company of Zimbabwe was proposed and subsequently established.
Other than the above mentioned deregulation and market based reforms, ESAP
did not foresee other sectoral initiatives directed to strengthen the competitive capacity
of small enterprises or of manufacturing industry at large. In fact,  the analitical focus is
primarily macro-economic and there is little explicit analysis of micro or firm level
adjustment needed at the level of the manufacturing firms. Firm level learning and
restructuring was not considered a constraint. Firm level responses would be
forthcoming. The only pronouncement concerned the importance of speed of
implementation: it was expected that “the faster the pace of adjustment measures, the
greater the likely extent of retrenchments and short term frictional  unemployment”...
”On the other hand, the faster and more effective the adjustment program, the more new
jobs will be created and the more the social costs of unemployment will be minimized”
(ESAP, 1991:8).
                                                
1 GoZ, 1991. Zimbabwe. A framework for economic reform (1991-95). Harare.
6The reform program was initially implemented largely in line with the proposed
schedule of measures that was incorporated in the ESAP document. Notable progress
was made in the areas of international trade, exchange rate and financial sector reforms,
the removal of price and wage controls and labour market restrictions, the
establishment of collective bargaining, and the promotion of foreign investment (by
creating the Zimbabwe Investment Centre). However, the country faced considerable
“headwinds” caused by a drought affecting agriculture which also required large scale
drought relief in rural areas (1993), the deterioration of the country’s terms of trade, and
the international recession in the early 90s. Most importantly, the implementation of the
fiscal policies and public sector reforms was seriously deficient, leading to continued
high levels of government expenditrures and borrowing, and ever higher interest rates2.
The failure of government to implement fiscal policies and the macro-economic effects
of the 1993 and 1995 droughts are the principal factors explaining the lack of recovery
in the first five years after the launching of ESAP (e.g. Bloch & Robinson, 1996).
The above mentioned reform measures, that were partially or wholly
implemented, had direct impacts on the operations of manufacturing industry. In their
detailed review of manufacturing industry trends, Braunerhjelm & Fors (1996)
estimated that in the first two years of ESAP manufacturing employment shrank by
some 20 000 jobs (Braunerhjelm & Fors, 1996: pp 25-28). The sectors that lost heavily
were metal & metal products (5300), textiles (2600), clothing & footwear (2100) and
the paper industry (2600). The relative decline in employment is however somewhat
less than the decline in output in the same period. ESAP and drought exerted their toll.
Exports did not grow as had been expected on the basis of the large initial devaluation
of the local currency (in early 90s). When the exchange rate later stabilized, in spite of
high levels of inflation, it became even less attractive for industries to export. The two
authors examined macro economic policy issues arising from their review (esp. in
relation to export growth) but also emphasized micro level adjustments. They
concluded that “notwithstanding that certain sectors are more likely to expand than
others, on the firm level the outcome will to a large extent depend on the actions and
preparations taken by firms themselves, independent of which sectors they belong to.
                                                
2 For a review of the ESAP, see Bloch E & Robinson, J, 1996. Zimbabwe: Facing the facts. Chapter 1 A
change of direction. Harare: Thompson Publications and GoZ, 1996, Programme for Economic and
Socials Transformation, ZIMPREST. Harare: Ministry of Finance
7How this process will carry on is an important subject for future study” (ibid, 1996:
88/9). In this paper we aim to shed more light on these firm level adjustments.
2.3 City of Bulawayo
Bulawayo is the second largest city of the country. It is located in the southern
region and represents an important international transportation node for traffic flows
between South Africa and countries north of the Limpopo river. During the early period
of white settlement of what became known as Rhodesia, Bulawayo was the largest and
most important urban center. Only to be surpassed by Harare (formerly known as
Salisbury), when that city became the administrative center of the then ‘self governing
colony’ and later became the capital of the country. Generally the pace of life in
Bulawayo is slower than Harare, and the mood is more provincial.
Bulawayo is the second largest industrial center. Notwithstanding, the industrial
community is fairly small and well established. Most sectors are dominated by family
owned businesses. Their owner/managers have often technical rather than financial
orientation. Its manufacturing industry represented, according to CSO figures of 1994,
30% of total manufacturing employment in the country. The table below gives an
overview of the composition of formal sector employment since 1980. The city didn’t
participate much in the early post-Independence boom. The Matabeleland region as a
whole suffered from domestic political troubles which negatively influenced economic
performance. Only in the second half of the 80s and after the domestic political
settlement in 1987, did Bulawayo employment grow.
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Formal sector employment and average annual growth rates, Bulawayo
1980 1985 1990 1994 80-85 85-90 90-94
Agriculture 80 123 265 77 9.0 16.6 -26.6
Mining 107 85 86 0 4.5 0.2 -100
Manufacturing 45676 44578 56452 62116 .05 4.8 2.4
Energy 1478 1552 1650 1482 1.0 1.2 -2.6
Construction 7321 1938 4346 9743 -23.3 17.5 22.4
Finan. services 1977 2219 2197 2481 2.3 -0.2 3.1
Distribution 13664 13954 16007 16655 0.4 2.8 1.0
Transport 14550 16066 14285 12108 2.0 -2.3 -4.0
Public admin. 9320 9192 8597 7154 -0.3 -1.3 -4.5
Education 3732 4896 9943 10295 5.6 15.2 0.9
Health 3185 3652 4130 4239 2.8 2.5 0.7
Domestic workers 23098 21521 22375 22364 -1.4 0.8 0.0
Other services 8763 11679 13866 15620 5.9 3.5 3.0
Total 132951 131455 154199 164334 -0.2 3.2 1.6
Source: CSO, various years, Quarterly Digest of Statistics. Harare and unpublished CSO data
The manufacturing sector is the most important source of formal sector
employment in the city. It represents 38% of the total, a share that has been rising
somewhat. Immediately after Independence in 1980 employment growth stagnated and
declined marginally, but both in the remaining pre-ESAP period and in the 90s
employment growth of Bulawayo exceeded the national average3. For Bulawayo the
manufacturing sector remains a key provider of formal sector employment, along side
construction and education (the latter thanks to the extension of primary education and
the establishment of a new National University of Science and Technology).
Notwithstanding this performance, employment growth both in manufacturing
industry and other sectors, has been insufficient to create sufficient jobs for a
fast growing labour force, depending on the estimates it varies for Bulawayo between 4
and 6% per annum. The informal sector has been growing at a much higher pace though
figures vary considerably.
There is little concrete evidence on the impact of adjustment on sectors and
firms in Bulawayo. A search in the archives of the local newspaper, The Chronicle,
generated little information of concrete events and impacts4. In 1991, the signs of ESAP
were positive, low interest rates, ample savings, export incentive scheme to import
                                                
3 Bulawayo  85-90: 4.8% p.a.; 90-94: 2.4% p.a.; Zimbabwe 85-90 2.9% and 1.2% respectively. Source:
CSO Quarterly Digest, various issues.
4 What follows below is based on interviews with several local bank managers, namely of  Stanbic Bank,
Standard Chartered and Zimbank, carried out in March 1996.
9inputs and government program to finance the import of machinery & equipment to
enable the manufacturing firms to modernize their equipment. Firms began to invest
financed using bank borrowing. However, in 1992/3 the picture changed radically. Real
interest rates rose rapidly, as did inflation. Import liberalization opened markets to
competing imports, drought reduced domestic demand further, as the Zimbabwe dollar
depreciated imported inputs and equipment became more expensive. Firms were hit
unaware while being in the middle of their modernization programs. Some of them got
caught in a debt trap and ran into liquidity problems. Assets that served as security
became overvalued, and were insufficient to cover debts.
A number of firms actually collapsed in 92/93, such as G&D shoes, ZECO
Engineering Ltd, two textile mills, an electrical consumer goods manufacturer and
smaller clothing companies5. Other survived by downsizing, retrenching workers and
by economizing. Again others sought to return to their core business but found it
difficult to find buyers for their non-core operations. Some other managed to penetrate
export markets but did not diversify their export clients and markets, being at risk.
Again others sought (links with) foreign buyers or franchising. Micro level adjustment
strategies varied across sectors and firms and it is to that issue that we will now turn.
3. FIRMS LEVEL RESTRUCTURING: THREATS, STRATEGIC
RESPONSES AND ACTIONS
3.1 Introduction to the research
In 1996 researchers of the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), and the Institute of
Housing & Urban Development (IHS) launched a collaborative research effort on urban
economic restructuring and local institutional responses. The research has the following
particular aims:
• to improve understanding of the nature and dynamics of economic restructuring
processes, in particular economic, institutional and physical processes;
                                                
5 Chronicle, 6/10/94. The Chronicle of 27/6/95 reported that in the first half of 1995 22 firms had been
liquidated. Since 1991 a total of 130 manufacturing companies had gone into liquidation, another 82 were
declared insolvent and at least 10 other were placed under judicial management. These are nation wide
figures.
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• to improve understanding of appropriate policy responses that may be undertaken
by local institutions, incl. local governments to promote local economic
development.
The joint research effort consisted of several research projects on economic and
urban management aspects of restructuring and was implemented with research partners
in Colombia, India and Zimbabwe6. One of these project focussed on examining
processes of economic restructuring in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, the strategic responses
and concrete actions that were adopted by local firms, business interest associations,
government agencies and by the Bulawayo City Council to improve the capacity of
local firms to respond to competitive challenges and to strengthen the capacity of local
institutions to cope with future economic challenges. The data presented and analysed
in this paper is generated by this research project
In view of the overall orientation of the research project and its resource
limitations, the research concentrated on a limited number of sectors that make up an
important part of the economy of Bulawayo. On the basis of interviews with local
business and government leaders, and unpublished data of the national Central
Statistics Office (CSO), it appeared that wearing apparel (3220), furniture (3320) and
metal fabrication (3810) were the three largest sectors in terms of the number of
manufacturing firms. The inclusion of the fourth sector, non-electrical machinery &
equipment (3820), has been motivated by its importance as a capital goods producing
sector. Together these sectors provide 33% of manufacturing employment in Bulawayo
in 1992/37. An attempt was made to obtain data from the CSO concerning the enterprise
sector and size structure for Bulawayo. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain the
CSO listing of the firms and their basic characteristics, on the basis of which a sample
might be drawn. It was therefore necessary to construct a basic listing and it was
decided to begin with the membership lists of the Matabeleland Chamber of Industries8.
The Chamber represents only a part of all manufacturing firms, therefore the list had to
be complemented by other means9. Additional sources used were the Directory of
                                                
6 The programme was financed by the Co-operation between the International Education Institutes and
the Agricultural University (SAIL).
7 CSO, 1995, Census of Industrial production 1992/93 report. Harare: CSO
8The chamber is a member of the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries (CZI).
9 On the basis of our estimates, the membership of the local chamber currently covers approximately 40%
of all registered firms.
11
Brand Names and Products, published by the Zimbabwe National Chamber of
Commerce and the Bulawayo Yellow Pages. An USAID sponsored local project of CZI
to identify of opportunities for subcontracting, provided additional data to complement
the basic list of names of firms. According to local informants this generated a fairly
complete list of all manufacturing firms in the selected sectors in Bulawayo.
Subsequently, the firms in the sample were selected in a systematic random manner
from this basic list. The operational target was 30 interviews per sector in order to
facilitate comparisons. In total 121 firms took part in the survey.
The leading questions guiding this research may be summarised as follows:
1. What types of economic factors/shocks have affected competitiveness of firms in
Bulawayo during the past 3 years?
2. What type of competition is faced by firms and what have been the principal changes
therein during the last 3 years?
3. What strategic responses were adopted by the firms and what concrete actions have
been undertaken by the firms?
4. What enterprise support services have played an important role and is the demand for
support services shifting as a result of changing terms of competition?
5. What is the use of specialised producer services and have processes of externalisation
taking place?
6. What are the contact patterns of firms in relation to the development of the firm?
A first round of results have been presented separately10. In this chapter the
focus is on the threats that firms perceived, the nature of their responses and the
concrete actions they have undertaken.
3.2 Threats
Competitive threats in the period 1993-1996 have arisen in the domestic market
as well as in export markets11. Firms found it more difficult to maintain their position
and profitability. In the domestic market, the main force of competitive threats
emanated from existing rival firms and from newly entered firms. Competitive threats
emanating from clients and from competing imports were of secondary importance.
                                                
10 Helmsing, A.H.J. 1998b. Survey of economic restructuring & competitiveness of manufacturing
industries, Bulawayo Zimbabwe, 1993-1996. Research Report. The Hague: ISS (mimeo).
11 For details see Helmsing, A.H.J. 1998b.
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Finally, suppliers and substitutes were not considered important new sources of
competition ESAP has no doubt contributed to the emergence of these competitive
threats, directly via its liberalization of imports (raw materials, intermediate and capital
goods) and allowing the emergence of competing imports (hitherto an negligible issue,
except for ‘popular’ smuggling) and indirectly by reducing impediments to private
sector development. In export markets firms reported increased competitive threats,
which as in the domestic market, were primarily caused by existing rival firms and
newly entered firms and by more price sensitive clients.
The second most important threat in the period has been unrelated to ESAP,
namely the 1994/1995 drought. In the case of Bulawayo the drought had not only
demand side but also supply side consequences. The first consisted of a severe cut in
consumer demand of the drought affected rural population, and the reduction in general
demand because of decling purchasing power as a result of high inflation caused by
government spending on drought relief. Supply side problems emanated from shortages
in water supply and water rationing in the second year of the drought, affecting the
operations of industry.
Macro-economic issues have pre-occupied the firms but these preoccupation’s
centered on inflation affecting purchasing power and threats emanating from trade
liberalization. Financial variables such as interest rate and exchange rate were less of a
concern.
In input markets two issues played a role. The one was the rising price levels of
(imported) inputs. The other refers to the increased availability of inputs. In the past
pre-ESAP period, access to inputs was controlled by firms existing in the market
through their (near preferential) allocation of foreign exchange. With liberalization
existing firms lost that advantage and potential rival firms obtained easier access to
needed inputs, raising competition.
3.3 Strategic responses
How have firms responded to these threats? The survey instrument identified 16
different responses (and one open option) and respondents were asked to indicate one
or more that firms considered best describing the course(s) of action formulated and
actually followed by them in the past three years. These strategic responses are listed in
the box below.
13
The 16 responses may be grouped into five categories: i) exit responses; ii)
client oriented defensive responses; iii) belt tightening defensive responses; iv)
rationalization of productive processes, and v) development of new markets and
products. Below we discuss each in more detail.
One of the passive exit responses is that a firm decides to adjust to lower sales
volumes, leading to a downsizing of operations and possibly to retrenchments of staff
and workers. A firm responding in this way, would accept that the terms and conditions
of competition in the market have changed, and that it would be beyond the control of
the firm itself to regain market share and/or sales volume to restore profitability. In the
case of Zimbabwe, the protection of the domestic market was lifted by the change in
policy regime. Another response is that firms that have been active in the end assembly
of imported components and parts, exit wholly or partially from manufacturing and
switch to (import) trade. They recognize the difficulty of competing with superior or
better priced imports but consider their own distribution networks as an important asset.
Obtaining exclusive distribution rights of major international brands is in such a case
often a complementary strategic action.
Strategic responses
a) adjustment to lower sales volumes, leading to downsizing of
operations and retrenchments of staff/workers
b) exit from manufacturing and switch to (import) trade or
combination of the two
c) increasing sales efforts to retain customers
d) reduce price and accept lower profit margin
e) reduce costs by economizing (reducing/postponing outlays)
f) reduce cost by efficiency measures
g) subcontracting (upward/downward) parts of manufacturing to others
in order to lower costs
h) (h) outcontracting of producer services in order to reduce costs
i) intensify marketing efforts, looking for new clients
j) improve client services
k) improve product quality by improving product design
l) improve product quality by improving production process
m) change market orientation by moving towards export markets
n) change market orientation by developing new market segments
o) develop new products
p) networking & alliances with other firms
q) other (to be specified by the respondent)
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Client oriented defensive responses refer to those where firms step up sales
efforts in order to maintain a market position, increase efforts to acquire new clients
and/or try to retain customers by improving client services. These are typically
immediate responses to declining sales i.e. they may be undertaking without radically
altering firm practices.
‘Belt tightening’ responses are also immediate ones. One is simply
economizing. That is to say to reduce costs either by not doing or by postponing cash
outlays (skimming). A stepped up version of cost reduction would be the adoption of
efficiency measures, whereby the firm critically reviews inputs in relation to outputs. A
third belt tightening response would be to accept lower profit margins in an attempt to
‘ride out the storm, hoping for better times’. These three responses are primarily
responses of a ‘status quo’ nature. Firms do not change radically what they do and how
they do it.
A more radical set of responses concern rationalization of the productive
processes of the firm. Firms often begin with improving the existing production
processes, investing in new equipment so as to improve quality and raise efficiency.
Firms that have establish themselves in the context of import substitution in small
domestic markets, often have taken on the production of parts and components in
absence of domestic suppliers but also in their attempt to expand their share in the value
chain. Foreign exchange scarcities provided an additional stimulus to manufacture these
components internally despite the small demand and problems of quality. Lifting
domestic trade protection and financial liberalization therefore often leads to a
rationalization of production processes. Several aspects have been identified. One
response may be to subcontract the manufacture of parts and components, or to
outcontract producer services or may even refer to development of networks and
alliances with other firms. Thus, while downsizing is a passive and negative response,
rationalization is an active and innovative response. It is recognized that old production
processes and arrangements (incl. vertical integration) cannot be sustained anymore in
the face of changing market conditions, and new production arrangements are
introduced.
The fifth category of responses concern the development of new markets and of
improved and new products. Five specific responses have been identified. A firm may
change market orientation by developing new market segments in existing product
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markets, export markets may be another option. improvement of product quality may
take place by improving the design of the product. Lastly, the firm may opt to develop
entirely new products.
The working hypothesis is that firms have adopted anyone type of response12.
However, one should take into account the possibility that firms have not developed
any explicit response. Several reasons may be forwarded. A firm may be part of a large
group of firms or be a subsidiary with no autonomy in these matters. Furthermore, it is
conceivable that the management of firms may simply not have responded in an alert or
explicit manner or may have discussed the strategic choices but was unable to choose at
any concrete response.  Lastly, some firms were very recently established and hence no
change in behaviour may be noticeable. In order to separate these situation, a filter was
applied. It turned out that of the 121 firms interviewed, 106 (88%) has discussed
external threats, their implications for their competitiveness and have set out concrete
line(s) of action. The findings presented below are restricted to these 106 firms. Table 2
below gives an overview as to the specific types of strategic responses.
The six most frequently cited responses were all in the market oriented and belt
tightening categories. Improving process design and improving product design were
specific responses of secondary importance (reported by more than 20 firms).
Differences between sectors are not very pronounced except in some instances. Down
sizing is typically a response practiced in the clothing sector, while switching to trade is
an exit response of non-elec machinery firms. The latter are also more active in
increasing sales efforts among existing clients, while the clothing sector puts more
emphasis on seeking new clients in existing markets and on improving client services.
Belt tightening responses are practiced across the board with little sectoral
variation, except that the clothing sector is notably more reluctant to accept lower profit
margins. Sub contracting appears to make more sense in the furniture industry than in
the other sectors, like non-elec. machinery. This sector has a wide range of products
which are often made in small batches. Hence, subcontracting is more difficult to
organize compared to furniture making. Improvement of product design is a more
frequent response in the consumer goods industries than in the capital goods producing
                                                
12 The survey instrument the possibility was kept open that firms would respond with other types of
responses. In the Zimbabwe survey only one instance this option was used.
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sectors. Clothing firms have been relatively speaking more active in developing new
markets including abroad.
Table 2
Type of strategic response, by firm
selected sectors, Bulawayo
Type of response Total
(#)
Total
(%)
Clothing
(%)
Furni-
ture
(%)
metal
fabr.
(%)
non-elec
mach.
(%)
Exit responses
 - downsizing 17 3.3 5.1 3.8 2.2 1.8
 - switch to trade 7 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 4.5
market oriented responses
 - increasing sales efforts 79 15.5 14.1 15.1 15.9 17.3
 - seek new clients 44 8.6 10.9 5.7 9.4 7.3
 - improve client services 44 8.6 10.3 7.5 8.7 7.3
Belt tightening responses
 - economizing 50 9.8 9.0 9.4 10.9 10.0
 - efficiency measures 64 12.5 12.8 11.3 13.8 11.8
 - lower profit margins 52 10.2 6.4 11.3 11.6 12.7
Rationalization of
production
 - subcontracting manuf' 9 1.8 1.3 3.8 1.4 0.9
 - outcontracting services 3 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.9
 - improve process design 34 6.7 7.1 7.5 7.2 4.5
 - networking & alliances 9 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.4 2.7
New markets and products
 - improve product design 42 8.2 9.6 10.4 5.8 7.3
 - new products 23 4.5 4.5 5.7 3.6 4.5
 - new market segment(s) 18 3.5 3.8 2.8 3.6 3.6
 - new export markets 15 2.9 3.8 2.8 2.2 2.7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Survey
Table 3 below summarizes responses by category of response. Defensive
strategies have been most prevalent. Undertaking efforts in existing markets and belt
tightening have been the predominant responses of the Bulawayo firms. New markets
and new products and rationalization of production have received much less attention.
Exit responses are surprisingly unimportant. It should be added though that the survey
was only applied to firms still in operation at the time of the survey. Firms that had
exited altogether have not been covered, leading to an underestimation of responses in
this category. Looking at differences by sectors. It may be observed that the clothing
and metal fabrication sectors have had a greater preference for market oriented
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responses than the other sectors. The belt tightening has also a more preferred option in
the engineering sectors. On the other hand, clothing and furniture have developed more
responses aiming at new markets and new products. Rationalization of productive
processes is more predominant in furniture.
If one would qualify the exit, market oriented and belt tightening as defensive
responses and the rationalization of production and new products and markets as the
innovative responses, then we may conclude that the defensive responses of the firms
have predominated. Innovative responses constitute only 30% of all strategic responses.
From a sectoral point of view it may be concluded that the furniture sector has the
highest proportion of innovative responses, while metal fabrication and non-elec.
machinery have the least proportion of innovative responses. The clothing sector finds
itself in an intermediate position.
Table 3
Category of strategic response,
Manufacturing firms, selected sectors, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
Category of response Total
(#)
Total
(%)
clothing
(%)
Furni-
ture
(%)
metal fab
(%)
non-elec
mach(%)
exit responses 24 4.7 5.1 3.8 3.6 6.4
market oriented responses 167 32.7 35.3 28.3 34.1 31.8
belt tightening responses 166 32.5 28.2 32.1 36.2 34.5
rationalization of production 55 10.8 9.6 14.2 10.9 9.1
new markets and products 98 19.2 21.8 21.7 15.2 18.2
510   100  100  100     100     100
From strategies to firms
The above tables presented aggregate picture on the frequency and relative
importance of the different strategic responses. The next step is to examine patterns of
response at the level of firms. It is important to note here that respondents could
indicate more than one response.
Examining patterns at the level of each firm, several interesting findings
emerged. First of all, there are firms that had chosen exclusively defensive responses,
but there are no firms that had adopted  exclusively innovative responses.  In other
words, innovation takes place in the context of defensive measures.
Some firms are more focused than others in their response (as indicated by the
number of responses that were marked by them). For the purpose of the analysis below,
firms have been categorized into three groups. Firstly, firms that have adopted only
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defensive responses. Firms that combined defensive with innovative responses. The
final group consists of ‘indecisive’ firms that have either not effectuated any strategic
choice (i.e. firms that did not pass the filter mentioned above) or their responses had
been so broad and multiple and was seen as lacking any real choice.13 Table 4 below
presents overall and sectoral pattern. There is no clear tendency towards any category of
response and it would appear that strategic responses and sector are unrelated to each
other14.  The latter confirms the hypothesis expressed by Braunerhjelm and Fors (1996),
and referred to above, that restructuring depends on firm behaviour that is largely
independent of the sector to which they belong.
                                                
13 Selection of firms was done with the following criteria. Firms that had not explicitly taken measures to
implement their adopted strategies were excluded. Furthermore, firms that adopted more that 6 responses
were excluded from the analysis. The cut off criteria is somewhat arbitrary and intuitive. It is motivated
by the need to screen out undeciding entrepreneurs and non-revealers. The defensive and innovative
category  is defined as firms having responses in both categories. The overall percentage of firms retained
in the sample is 68% and varies some what by sector. Clothing and metal fabrication have the highest
proportion of firms screen out (62 and 59% respectively), while three quarters of the furniture firms and
81.5% of the engineering firms were retained.
14The cross tabulation yielded a chi square (6.862), significance (.334)
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Table 4
Strategic behaviour of firms, Selected manufacturing sectors, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
Strategy Total Clothing Furniture Metal
Fabri-
cation
Non-Elec
Machinery
Indecisive 38
(31.4)
13
(38.2)
7
(25.0)
13
(40.6)
5
(18.5)
Defensive only 40
(33.1%)
10
(29.4%)
11
(39.3%)
11
(34.4%)
8
(29.6%)
Defensive & Innovative 43
(35.5%)
11
(32.4%)
10
(35.7%)
8
(25.1%)
14
(51.8%)
Total 121
(100%)
34
(28.1%)
28
(23.1)
32
(26.4%)
27
(22.3%)
Table 5 examines strategic behaviour by firms size. Smaller firms are somewhat
more prone to adopt an innovative strategy than larger firms. Small firms and even
more so medium sized firms are also more indecisive in comparison to large and very
large firms. Large and very large firms have a more than proportional representation in
the defensive and combination strategies. Differences are however small. When looked
at in terms of size, it would seem that strategy and size are unrelated to eachother.15
Table 5
Strategic behaviour of firms and firm size
Selected manufacturing sectors, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
Strategy Total <=25 26 - 100 101 - 250 > 250
Indecisive firms 38
(31.4%)
12
(34.3%)
16
(42.1%)
3
(15.0%)
7
(25.9%)
Defensive only 40
(33.1%)
10
(28.6%)
12
(31.6%)
7
(35.0%)
10
(37.0%)
Defensive &
Innovative
43
(35.5%)
13
(37.1%)
10
(26.3%)
10
(50.0%)
10
(44.4%)
Total 121
(100%)
35
(100%)
38
(100%)
20
(100%)
27
(100%)
3.4 Concrete actions taken by firms
The strategies that firms formulate in response to perceived threats are
statements of overall goals and of broad indications as to how these may be achieved.
These strategies guide subsequent action in the main functional areas of the firm, such
as the physical process of manufacturing, physical aspects of the products,
management, finance, labour relations and human resource development, marketing,
                                                
15 The crosstabulation gave a chi square of (5.91), significance (.433)
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networking and inter-firm relations. The second part of the research consists of
examining how overall strategies are translated into concrete actions in each of these
functional areas of the firm. By analising concrete actions a more detailed picture is
generated firm level restructuring patterns.
The field instrument identified a series of possible courses of action. These
concrete actions were grouped under 9 categories. These are:
1. Downsizing actions involving reduction of manufacturing operations.
2. Physical product changes and product innovations, which refer to improving,
revising and changing the products/services on offer.
3. Physical manufacturing process innovations which lead to a revision and
improvement of production processes.
4. Management which concerns the revision and improvement of management
capabilities, management organization and processes.
5. Financial restructuring concerning changing ownership structure, debt
conversion and rescheduling.
6. Human resource development involving the strengthening of knowledge, skills
and expertise of employees.
7. Markets and marketing which concerns the revision and improvement of
knowledge about current and prospective clients and improving knowledge of
current and prospective clients about the firm and its products.
8. Networking which concerns subcontracting of manufacturing operations,
outcontracting of producer services, franchising and manufacture under license.
9. Inter-firm co-operation involving mutually agreed joint undertaking of particular
activities in domestic/export markets.
A detailed enumeration of actions identified under each of the areas see
appendix 1 of  the research report (Helmsing, 1998b)
Table 6 below gives an overview of the categories and of the most important
actions within each category. This table is based on the indicated “dominant action”
within each category16. It may be concluded that five types of concrete actions have
                                                
16 Respondents could give multiple answers in each category as well as add their own actions different
from the ones listed. In order to reduce the range to be analyzed firms were asked to indicate which of the
selected actions has been the dominant one.
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predominated. First of all, more that 90% of the firms have undertaken concrete actions
to change the physical process of manufacturing and physical aspects of the products.
Thus, product and process innovations of different type and intensity have been adopted
by a large majority of the firms. The most prevalent type of action is of an engineering
type. The other three important categories of action were marketing, human resource
development and management. Areas of action such as networking, inter-firm co-
operation, finance and down sizing have only been adopted by a small proportion of
firms.
In terms of product innovations the emphasis has been on improving the
technical specifications and change in physical characteristics of existing products, and
for a minority of firms it consisted of introducing new products and new product
groups. Two sectors show some variation. One is the furniture making industry which
has put a far greater effort on improving technical characteristics of existing products
and proportionally far less effort on new products and new product groups. The other is
the clothing industry which has shown a much greater propensity to develop new
product groups and towards changing physical appearance.
As regards process innovations, the emphasis has been generally on improving
quality control and on upgrading existing plant and equipment and acquiring new plant
and equipment. A physical re-design of the organization of production processes, so as
to improve workflow, has been much less practiced, except in the furniture making
industry. An organizational re-design of operations, including decentralization of
production decisions, involving workers in quality control have not been important
actions among the firms.
The concrete actions in the area of marketing have the same order of priorities,
namely first and foremost on clients and products in existing markets and market
development for existing products (notably in the clothing industry) and much less in
relation to market development for new products. Again the furniture making industry
is, in relative terms, a favourable exception.
The concrete actions in the area of human resource development have been
fairly conventional. That is to say, skill upgrading in areas of immediate need has been,
by far, the most important (but narrow) concern of the firms, while only a small
minority has given more attention to delegation of responsibilities and to personnel
development programs. Other areas of action, such as worker involvement in decision
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making, change in reward systems have hardly figured among the dominant actions
taken by the firms in the past three years. It is interesting to note differences between
sectors which relate to skill content of production processes. The clothing industry has
been notably less active in the area of human resource development, on the other hand,
metal fabrication and machinery sectors have paid far more attention to these issues.
Strengthening of management capacity is the fifth area of concrete actions,
undertaken by the firms. Most attention has been given to increase the financial & cost
control and control of internal operations by management and to a lesser extent on
management of quality control. The integration of production and sales/marketing
management so as to be able to translate changes in markets more swiftly into products
and production has only been adopted by a small minority of firms. Other important
areas such as human resource management, sourcing of inputs, research & development
and strategic management have received very little attention.
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Table 6
Concrete actions undertaken by firms in past 3 years,
 selected sectors, Bulawayo, 1996
Dominant action Total clothing furniture metal fab machinery
Downsizing 18,2 32,4 32,1 3,1 3,7
 - discontinue least profitable 14,0 23,5 28,6 0,0 3,7
Product innovations 92,6 97,1 89,3 90,6 96,3
 - improve technical spec’tns 29,8 14,7 46,4 28,1 33,3
 - change physical charac’tics 13,2 23,5 14,3 6,3 7,4
 - new products 16,5 17,6 10,7 18,8 18,5
 - new product groups 14,9 26,5 3,6 15,6 11,1
Process innovations 90,9 85,3 96,4 96,9 85,2
 - quality control 24,8 20,6 17,9 28,1 33,3
 - upgrading plant & equipment 19,0 14,7 17,9 18,8 25,9
 - acquisition new plant & eq. 15,7 20,6 21,4 12,5 7,4
 - improving inputs 11,6 17,6 10,7 12,5 3,7
 - re-design plant/process 11,6 8,8 21,4 9,4 7,4
Management 83,5 85,3 75,0 87,5 85,2
 - financial management 20,7 17,6 17,9 31,3 14,8
 - internal control 15,7 11,8 25,0 12,5 14,8
 - quality mgmt 12,4 5,9 7,1 18,8 22,2
 - integration prod/sales mgmt 11,6 11,8 3,6 9,4 22,2
Financial restructuring 23,1 29,4 17,9 18,8 25,9
 - rescheduling of debts 8,3 8,8 7,1 9,4 7,4
HRD 86,0 73,5 85,7 93,8 92,6
 - skill upgrading 31,4 32,4 28,6 40,6 22,2
 - delegation responsibility-'s 19,8 17,6 25,0 25,0 11,1
 - personal career development 11,6 2,9 7,1 9,4 29,6
Marketing 86,8 88,2 85,7 84,4 88,9
 - existing markets 28,1 38,2 21,4 21,9 29,6
 - existing products 19,0 17,6 10,7 21,9 25,9
 - new products 12,4 11,8 17,9 9,4 11,1
 - specific advertising 9,9 5,9 14,3 12,5 7,4
Networking 27,3 23,5 25,0 34,4 25,9
 - subcontr.subprocess 9,9 8,8 14,3 3,1 7,4
 - subcontr compts local 9,1 2,9 3,6 21,9 11,1
IF co-operation 28,9 41,2 14,3 31,3 25,9
 - joint marketing 9,9 14,7 3,6 15,6 3,7
Source: Survey
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The four areas in which firms have been least active in the period analised were
networking, inter-firm co-operation, financial restructuring and down sizing. Starting
with the latter, it is important to note that downsizing has been restricted primarily to
clothing  and furniture making industry. In the other two sectors downsizing (other than
a complete closure of the company) has been negligible. In almost all instances,
downsizing focused on closing down least profitable product groups, without switching
to trading. Other alternatives, such as closing down sub processes or manufacture of
components and parts, with or without subcontracting, have not been contemplated on
any scale by the respondents. This is a somewhat surprising result. The reason being
that firms that have established themselves in a long period of (forced) import
substitution would have, in all likelihood, engaged themselves in the (sub-optimal)
manufacture of components and parts in order to save the very scarce foreign exchange.
One would expect trade liberalization to trigger micro-level adjustment in the
composition of production processes.
Surprisingly few firms engaged in financial restructuring. Most actions
concentrated on debt rescheduling and debt conversion. Other actions such as
expanding equity, acquiring new domestic or foreign partners were hardly registered.
Zimbabwean industry has traditionally been self financing. The debt problem that
emerged in the early/mid 90s had several causes. One is the substantial  investments
made by firms in plant and equipment which was partly financed with bank loans. The
second is the unexpected high level of interest rates which followed the financial
liberalization and the third was the rapid decline in sales as a result of recession and
drought17.
Networking and inter-firm co-operation have been relatively unimportant areas
of action undertaken by the firms in the past three years. Networking has primarily
focused on subcontracting of subprocesses and the manufacture of components by local
firms. Its relatively minor importance (less than 10% of the firms undertook some
action) is consistent with the observations made earlier in relation to process
innovations where subcontracting was found to be adopted by only a small proportion
of the firms. International networking, either through subcontracting components or
parts or through manufacture under license, have not played any significant role. Inter-
                                                
17 Source: field notes 1997, press reports in Chronicle
25
firm co-operation focused on joint marketing  efforts in export markets. Other forms of
co-operation, such as sharing or pooling facilities, jointly purchasing or contracting
inputs and services or co-manufacturing and joint tendering have not been practiced.
Overlooking these responses, one is tempted to conclude that the firms in
Bulawayo are as yet adopting fairly conventional actions, in areas of product and
process innovations, in marketing, in HRD and in management. ‘New’ competition and
micro-level transition towards an ‘entrepreneurial firm’, as defined by Michael Best
above, would however require more actions in the areas of product and product group
development not necessarily via more hardware but via reorganization of production
processes within the firm, changing management of internal processes as well as more
actions in the areas of networking and inter firm co-operation.
Actions by defensive versus actions by innovative firms
Do innovative firms adopt similar actions as defensively responding firms?
Below we have examined this issue with respect to the actions undertaken by the firms
in the 1992-1995 period as well as on the actions that were identified, by the
respondents, to be undertaken in the next three years18. In the table below we have
summarized those instances where differences in the distribution are significant, using
the chi square test. In all instances, innovative firms are more prone to adopt these
actions than defensive firms.
With regard to actions in the past three years, the differences between the two
types of firms, have not been very strong and are restricted to only 4 issues, namely,
diversification into new product groups, integrating management of production, sales
and marketing, research on existing markets and individual advertising. Nevertheless,
these are relevant ones in terms of innovation and ‘new competition’. One possible
explanation for the lack of differentiated responses between predominantly innovation
and defensive firms is that the two groups partially overlap (there are no exclusively
innovative firms) That is to say all firms undertake certain immediate defensive
responses. A second factor could be the time lag in developing actions addressing the
                                                
18 For each action the respondent could respond yes or no. Cross tabulating for two subgroups of firms
generated 2*2 tables for which chi squares were computed. These are reproduced in table 7 in the main
text.
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longer term. In other words it would take time for differences in strategies to manifest
themselves in actions.
Table 7
Past and future actions: Defensive only and Innovative firms
Type of action Chi Square Signif’ce
Actions in past 3 years
Diversifying into new product groups I>D   2.726  .09867
Integrating production, sales and marketing management I>D   3.201  .07360
Research on existing markets I>D   4.372  .03653
Individual advertising I>D   2.986  .08399
Desirable future actions
Downsizing switching to trading I>D   8.236  .00411
Improve technical characteristics existing ppal product I>D   2.960  .08536
Change physical appearance I>D   4.723  .02975
New product development I>D   3.616  .05720
Diversify into new product group I>D   3.020  .08223
Upgrading plant & equipment I>D   7.432  .00641
Improve inputs I>D   4.155  .04152
Improve quality control I>D   5.382  .02034
Strengthening internal control of operations I>D   9.103  .00255
Integrating production, sales and marketing management I>D   4.359  .03680
Procurement/Sourcing of inputs I>D   7.274  .00700
Management of research & development I>D   2.795  .09454
Skill upgrading I>D   3.394  .06542
Management training I>D   5.032  .02488
Component subcontracting I>D   8.236  .00411
Source: computed from survey
With regard to areas of future action, there are more differences between the
two types of firms. In comparison to defensive firms, a greater proportion of innovative
firms seeks to be active in product innovations (of both existing and new products), pay
more attention to process innovation in terms of upgrading of equipment, improving
quality of inputs and improving quality control. Also in the area of management,
innovative firms orient themselves more to strengthening of control of operations,
integrating production, sales and marketing, put more emphasis on sourcing of inputs
and management of R&D processes. More attention to management is also reflected in
future training efforts. Lastly, innovative firms are more prone to engage in component
subcontracting than defensive firms.  One is tempted to conclude that although overall
the actions of the Bulawayo firms have followed existing paths, at least among the
innovative firms, some elements of ‘new’ competition become visible.
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4. ENTERPRISE SUPPORT SERVICES
The research has made an inventory of enterprise support services and has
established which of these have played a key role to the firms for the implementation of
their strategic actions. In addition, respondents to the survey have been asked to
indicate which support services are important for their planned future actions. The
comparison of the two gives some indication of the trends in demand for support
services. In addition respondents were asked to indicate their institutional preferences.
That is to say they were asked to identify which would be the most desirable
institutional forms through which particular support services ought to be delivered in
the future.
The following support services were identified: 1) general information and
enterprise support technological support services; 2) marketing support services; 3)
financial support services, and, 5) training services. The details of the enumerated
support services in each of these categories and of the institutional modalities are found
in the Appendix 2 of thie research report (Helmsing, 1998b). The table below presents
an overview of the support services which according to the respondents have been
instrumental in the success of the firm in the past three years.
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Table 8
Relative importance of enterprise support services
Category - type of support service Frequency
General information and enterprise assistance
• general information & promotion 33 (27%)
• local/regional promotion 25 (21%)
• information regulatory policies 19 (16%)
• small enterprise promotion 12 (10%)
Technological support services
• product design services 57 (47%)
• quality control and standards 39 (32%)
• R&D on manufacturing technologies 26 (21%)
• technical assistance and industrial extension 12 (10%)
• databases & technological information services 5 (4%)
Marketing support services
• organisation of domestic fairs 47 (39%)
• general market & export information services 25 (21%)
• identification of export opportunities 20 (16%)
• representation in international fairs 15 (12%)
• identification of buyers abroad 11 (9%)
• identification of international trading firms 10 (8%)
• information on design & standards for exports 10 (8%)
• distribution of publicity material abroad 6 (5%)
• representation in international tenders etc. 1 (1%)
Financial support services
• investment loans 58 (48%)
• venture capital 11 (9%)
• leasing 7 (6%)
• loan guarantees 7 (6%)
• credit insurance 6 (5%)
• reprogramming of debts 6 (5%)
• cofinancing of training projects 1 (1%)
• cofinancing of technological updating projects -
• cofinancing of marketing projects 2 (2%)
• cofinance of management improvement programs 1 (1%)
Training services
• vocational training 50 (41%)
• technological updating 29 (24%)
• management training 28 (23%)
• training supervisory management 38 (31%)
• financial management training 40 (33%)
• training in marketing & exports 24 (20%)
Several conclusions may be drawn. First of all, enterprise support in the past
few years has been oriented primarily towards training services. Of the ten most
frequently cited support services, firms list 5 training services. This is somewhat
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unexpected as Zimbabwe doesn’t have a specialized training service for industry nor a
particular performance record in this area. Bulawayo counts however with an important
Polytechnic College specialized in trades for industry and the National University of
Science & Technology which was established in Bulawayo in the late 80s to respond to
demands for high level technical training.
A large number of firms mention investment loans as a key support service.
This may be explained by the World Bank financed, loan facility that was made
available to manufacturing industry under the Economic Structural Adjustment
Programme.  Marketing support services  have been of a relatively limited importance,
in spite of the increasing attention firms have begun to pay to maintaining existing and
entering new markets. The Bulawayo Industry Fair is the country’s second largest
domestic fair (after Harare’s Agricultural Show) and is the most important one to the
local industry. With regard to technological support services, firms list quality control
& standards (Southern African Institute of Standards) and product design as key areas
where they used support services.
Differences between defensive and innovative firms
Do innovative firms demand different support services than defensive firms?
Table 9 gives the results of the comparisons. Differences are found in marketing and
general promotion & information and reprogramming of debts, On the whole the
evidence is however not very strong and at this moment would not warrant a plea to
steer the development of the support system in any special direction.
Table 9
Use of support services in past three years: Defensive and Innovative firms
Support services used in past three years Chi Square Signif’ce
General Enterprise promotion and information with local
orientation
I>D   5.8286  .01577
Technological support: Technological databases I>D   2.895  .08884
Marketing support: info on product standards, design &
packaging
I>D   2.895  .08884
Marketing support: distribution promotion materials
abroad
I>D   2.895  .08884
Marketing support: introduction ot foreign buyers I>D   3.909  .04802
Financial support services: reprogramming of debt I>D   2.895  .08884
Source: computed from survey
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Institutional preferences for service delivery
In the past decade or so, enterprise support systems underwent considerable
changes in many countries. State or public sector services lost their dominant position
due to their performance and to changes in the demand for services. On the whole, a
greater institutional diversity emerged. Public or parastatal services exist alongside
private sector and there is a great variety of mixed public-private modalities. One would
readily accept a certain degree of ‘path dependency’ as regards the evolution of
institutional support services. I.e. that the historical institutional context in a particular
country or region would have a considerable influence as to which kind of institutional
modality form would have greater acceptance than others. There is however relatively
little theory to explain what is the most appropriate institutional form in which
particular support services can be organized and delivered.
Taking this into account the research approached the matter in an empirical
manner and focused on identifying the institutional preferences of the users of these
services, the firms in our survey. The following procedure was adopted. First a list of
specialist support services was given and respondents were asked to identify which they
considered important taking into account the actions they had in mind to strengthen
their competitive capacity in the near future. Subsequently, and based on international
literature, various institutional delivery options were listed out of which the respondent
could make a choice19. The answer to our questions varied by type of service. The next
table presents on overall view of the findings.
                                                
19 Levy, B. 1994. Succesful small and medium enterprises and their support systems: a comparative
analysis of four countries. Washington: World Bank.
Levitsky, J. 1993. Private sector organizations and support for small and microenterprises. In: Helmsing,
A.H.J. & Kolstee, Th. Eds. 1993  Small enterprises and changing polices. London: IT Publications.
Levitsky, J. 1994. Business associations in countries in transition to market economies. Small enterprise
Development, 5, 3, 24-34
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Table 10
Support services and institutional preferences
Type of Service Frequency Preferred institutional modality
General enterprise support services
• general business advice 56 (46%) industry or sector association
• local economic development
promotion
52 (43%) local government
• business information centers 48 (40%) industry association
Technological support services
• quality control & standards 68 (56%) government agency
• R&D on manufacturing technology 56 (46%) sector association
• product design services 54 (45%) commercial firms; sector association
• technical assistance & industrial
extension
34 (28%) sector association; equipment
suppliers
• data bases and technological
information services
32 (26%) sector association
Marketing support services
• organization of domestic fairs 66 (55%) government agency
• information services on export
markets
41 (34%) sector associations; government
agency
• representation in international fairs 26 (22%) government agency; international
trading firms
• identification of export opportunities 22 (19%) government agency; sector
association
• export insurance 7 (6%) government agency; sector
association
Financial services
• investment finance 61 (50%) commercial banks
• venture capital 26 (22%) central government
• loan guarantees 19 (16%) commercial banks
• rescheduling of debt 11 (9%) commercial banks
• credit insurance 10 (8%) central government agency;
commercial banks
• cofinancing of techn. updating
projects
8 (7%) government agency
• cofinancing mgmt improvement
programmes
5 (4%) sector association
• cofinancing of marketing projects 3 (3%) government agency
Training services
• vocational training 81 (67%) academic centre
• training of supervisory staff 52 (43%) sector association; academic center
• management training 52 (43%) sector association; academic center
• financial management training 50 (41%) academic center
• technological updating 45 (37%) sector association; private consultants
• training in marketing and export 38 (31%) private consultants; sector
associations
Source: Survey
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As regards general assistance services there is a clear preference for general or
sector specific business associations and for local government. Private and non-profit
foundations, which do exist for the purpose of enterprise development play little or no
role in the institutional preferences of the respondents.
The firms have a clear preference for sector associations as providers of
technological support services. Government is only seen to play a role in the
specification and testing of quality control and standards. Equipment suppliers are often
seen as important sources of technological information to firms. In our case they do, but
less prominently. For product design private or commercial providers are seen as an
important source. Academic centers play a relatively minor role as regards
technological support services, in spite of the establishment of the National University
of Science & Technology in Bulawayo (with specialization in engineering).
The interviewed firms continue to see a considerable role seen for central
government in the provision of marketing services, especially in relation to export
markets (roles currently performed by ZIMTRADE) and in the organization of domestic
trade & industry fairs. Inter-firm organization at the sector level is, once more,
considered an important secondary option to organize marketing support services.
Private sector based specialist marketing consultants are not considered to be viable
alternative.
As regards financial services, the dominant role of commercial banks is re-
affirmed though there remains a role seen for government, especially as regards venture
capital (Zimbabwe Venture Capital Company). The latter is somewhat unexpected
given the rapid expansion and diversification of Zimbabwe’s financial sector since
financial liberalization in the early nineties. Partnerships between the public and private
sector for industrial restructuring and innovation has not gained much credibility. Only
a small minority of firms consider these as relevant options. Last but not least, training
services remain firmly in the realm of academic centers, but there is a clear shift
towards sector associations and private commercial providers.
Do defensive firms have different institutional preferences than innovative
firms. Are the latter “loners” and the defensive firms more dependent on government?
This issues has not yet been researched.
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5. PRODUCER SERVICES
Under ‘new competition’, producer services (such as accounting, publicity,
finance, computer, design, transport & distribution, engineering, procurement,
marketing etc.) play an important role. The reason being that determinants of
competitive capacity of enterprises have become manifold and are extended into all
major functional areas of the enterprise (Goe, 1991). In the majority of cases these
services, if provided internally from within the firms, represent high fixed costs and
often have a high cost risk. Often a firm may not have sufficient internal demand or the
services have a high level of complexity which makes it difficult for a company to
internalize them. In these cases it would be advantageous for the firm to draw external
expertise. It is often argued also that firms that grew up under protected markets of the
import substitution era, have either incorporated certain functions for control purposes
(e.g. transport) or have not developed certain functions, such as marketing (cf
Helmsing, 1993). The existence of a ‘seller’s market gave the firms little incentive to do
so. Alternatively, functions may not have been available in the market and firms
therefore have to internalize them (e.g. computer hardware and software).  Thus, there
are several factors that may lead to the hypothesis that firms would increasingly rely in
external expert services as competition heightens (due to liberalization) and the terms
of competition change (due to ‘new competition’).
The research has sought to establish the status of producer services, their recent
evolution and the factors that have caused any changes in the manner in which a firm
caters for them. The next table gives a panoramic overview of these issues for each of
the 20 producer services.
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Table 11
Producer services: internalised and contracted, combination, and frequency of change
Producer
service
Key
service
in past
3 yrs*
Desirable
service in
future**
Internal
service
Fully
externally
contracted
service
Partially
contracted
Proportion
contracted
(n)
Frequency
of  change in
past 3
yrs***
Accounting 20.5 46% 48% 31% 23% 46% (27) 2%
Advert. &
Publicity
26.8 55% 58% 16% 9% 69% (14) 2%
Banking & Fin
Serv.
11.1 31% 92% 6% 2% 35%  (7) 2%
Catering 0.8 7% 40% 5% 5% 26% (10) 2%
Cleaning 19.5 7% 77% 7% 14% 33% (20) 0%
Comp.
Hardware
14.7 37% 53% 7% 6% 29% (7) 1%
Computer
Software
12.9 35% 35% 16% 7% 30% (10) 2%
Design services 20.0 50% 86% 5% 3% 24%  (9) 0%
Employment
agency
2.6 12% 67% 14% 13% 29% (20) 1%
Labour
recruitment
2.9 19% 75% 9% 10% 27% (16) 0%
Engineering &
repairs
9.9 24% 34% 24% 40% 24% (55) 0%
Legal services 2.3 11% 2% 85% 1% 90% (5) 0%
Maintenance
grounds &
buildings
19.3 5% 67% 11% 5% 71% (11) 0%
Management
services
10.7 29% 69% 12% 13% 46% (22) 0%
Marketing 21.5 45% 86% 5% 5% 70% (9) 0%
Procurement 7.3 16% 88% 2% 8% 61% (15) 0%
Security 7.8 14% 42% 19% 37% 55% (50) 0%
Training 31.1 69% 6% 1% 2% 25% (2) 0%
Transport &
distribution
9.0 19% 59% 4% 2% 73% (7) 0%
Transport  of
staff
3.5 14% 78% 2% 4% 56% (10) 0%
* respondents were asked to assess on a scale of 1 to 5 the role the service played in raising
competitiveness of the firm; these assessment were summed and divided by the sum total maximum
score for each service.
** percentage of firms responding
*** number of firms that has changed the provision of the service in the past three years increasing
contracting
Source: Survey
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It is worth noting that certain services are not readily used by all firms. For
example, catering services, advertising & publicity, computers. For these services, these
firms don’t make a choice for either ‘make’ or ‘buy’20.
The services that are most frequently contracted externally are legal services,
accounting services, engineering & repairs, security and advertising & publicity and
computer software. It is worth noting that most of these outcontracted services are not
considered critical to raise competitiveness. e.g. legal services, engineering & repairs,
and security, and possibly with the exception of accounting services and advertising.
The services in which one would expect more external (specialist) contracting
for the purposes of strengthening ‘new’ competition capacity, such as design services,
financial services, marketing and procurement (global sourcing), externalization is not
taking place. Indeed 3 of the 5 services that are considered, by the firms, as being a key
to raising competitiveness, there is little outcontracting (notably design, training and
marketing). The only positive sign is the fact that the mentioned services are considered
to be services which the respondents would wish to have locally available in the future.
Even in traditional services such as industrial and office cleaning, logistics &
distribution, transport of staff, external contracting of services is relatively low.
Finally, it is important to stress the lack of change with respect to the
outcontracting and externalization of producer services. In this respect the situation is
not much different from the one concerning industrial subcontracting. In both instances
there is, on the whole, a relatively low degree of externalization.
In view of these evidence, the hypothesis formulated above needs to be rejected:
Zimbabwean firms are not ‘vertically disintegrating’ in as far as producer services are
concerned. Externalization is generally at low levels and no significant increase can be
detected.
Are there differences in the pattern of externalization and outcontracting of
producer services between defensive and innovative firms? As we saw above, there is
generally little externalization and outcontracting and little changes were observed in
the period 1992-1995. The numbers are small and the differences between innovative
and defensive firms are too small to be significant.
                                                
20 This explains why the percentages of columns 4, 5 and 6 do not add up to 100.
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6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
With the implementation of the structural adjustment programme ‘old’
institutions have fallen away (e.g. forex allocation, import controls, seller’s markets)
and firms have been exposed to a greater variety of external and competitive threats.
Not all firms responded to these external changes in innovative ways. A large number is
‘indecisive’ and made no explicit real choices. Others reacted defensively, and these
firms may take indeed the ‘low road’ of (de-)industrialization. The strong impression
the research (survey and interviews) has generated is that these defensive responses are
born out of necessity and lack of knowledge as to possible avenues and options of
change (incl. the ‘how to change’), while keeping the business running ‘as usual’ but
under increasing stresses and strains.
In adjusting to liberalized markets, firms have to redefine their routines and
practices on many fronts, i.e. not only in terms of technology. Product and process
innovations are needed but also strengthening of management, developing of marketing
functions and engaging in HRD. In this context, we do observe some differences
between defensive and innovative firms. The latter pay more attention to areas that are
listed as critical to ‘new competition’ (product and product group development, better
integration of production, marketing and sales and other management improvements,
and those in the area of marketing).
The competitive capacity of firms depends not only on its internal capacity, but
also on the efficiency and capacity of its suppliers and on the environment in which
they operate. Support institutions are part of this environment. One of the ‘blind spots’
in structural adjustment policies has been the creation of new institutions that enable
firms to compete effectively in liberalized markets. Enterprise support services for
industry continue to play a role, but there is little theory that guides its
institutionalization. This study has shown that there continues to be use of and demand
for enterprise support services. These are not limited to technology, but extend to
financial services, marketing, training and general business services. The enterprise
support system itself is being liberalized, where government has become less dominant
and sector associations have become more prominent.
As to the institutional modalities of services delivery and the preferences of
firms, it may be concluded that firms in Bulawayo have not ‘en masse’ turned away
from public agencies, though the functions these agencies play, are more narrowly
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defined than in the past. Private sector firms perform only particular roles (notable
product design, training and international trade). Sector associations have become one
of the key intermediaries through which firms acquire information and support. The
general industrial association, the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, has lost
importance as is evidenced by declining membership21, while sector associations have
increased in importance.
The notion of ‘innovative milieu’ centers around public, collective and private
institutions involved in R&D, generating and transmitting technological innovations. In
an innovative milieu there is interaction between firms and the institutions concerned in
order to coordinate the direction of information gathering and R&D efforts. Perhaps the
most sobering point is in the case of Bulawayo is the notable absence of academic
institutions among the agencies most preferred to deliver technological support
services. This would seem to be indicative of an absence of concrete interactions.
Sector associations are the key intermediary with respect to technological support
services. with commercial firms and government agencies performing particular roles.
The role of these sector associations, their strengths and weaknesses, are as yet not well
understood22.
Producer or business services refer to functions that support internal
coordination and external transactions as well as direct services that support
manufacturing operations. There is some overlap between these producer services and
the enterprise support services examined above. Both types of services contribute to the
creation of an innovative milieu. Specialist producer service firms that establish
themselves in response to externalization of these services by established
manufacturing firms, create agglomeration advantages for other (and smaller) firms that
hitherto had not internalized these services nor had any access to them. The research
found that relatively little externalization of these producer services had actually taken
place among established manufacturing firms since adjustment began. The ones that
have been externalized refer to ‘conventional’ producer services, but not to those that
play a role in ‘new’ competition. Very few firms shifted towards outcontracting of
producer services during the period analyzed, and no differences could be detected
between innovative and defensive firms. It would therefore seem reasonable to
                                                
21 Partly this may be explained by having lost its function in the (pre-ESAP) forex allocation system.
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conclude that in the case of Bulawayo, producer services do not as yet contribute to
creating an innovative milieu.
For the creation of a local innovative milieu ‘it takes two to tango’. Both firms
and support systems have to come into tune with each other. However, both have been
subjected to adjustment. There is a tendency towards ‘vertical link up’ via the sector
associations. There would seem to be however, as yet, insufficient interaction between
the firms themselves and between firms and the support institutions to coordinate
actions to strengthen local competitive capacity.
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